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Abstract
Transition  literature  has  emphasized  stabilization  and  * Reduced  spending  on  government  transfers
enterprise restructuring.  Both cross-country analyses  and  contributed  to a sharp increase in income inequality  in
country-specific studies  have tended to focus on fiscal  the CIS.
stabilization  and its indicators, highlighting  the  * Fiscal  risks increased during the transition.
importance  of quantitative fiscal adjustment to  * Initial  conditions  allowed  Central  European  and
stabilization  outcomes.  Less attention has been paid to  Baltic  countries  to  maintain  higher  expenditures,
the qualitative dimensions of fiscal adjustment in  which  may  have  contributed  to  their  faster  economic
transition.  recovery  and  political  support  for  the  reforms.
Alam and Sundberg take stock of the extent to which  The  authors  argue  that  the  challenge  today  for
fiscal  adjustment  has  occurred  during  the  first  decade  fiscal  policy  in  these  countries  is  to  facilitate  the
of  transition  in  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  transition-particularly  in  reallocating  resources  from
dimensions.  They define quality  as the extent to which:  large  state-owned  enterprises  to  new  small  and
(1) pro-growth  expenditure essential for creating future  medium-size  firms,  and providing  priority  public
economic and social assets are maintained;  (2) pro-poor  services  and  targeted  transfers  to  assist  those
expenditure, such as poverty-targeted  transfers, necessary  adversely  affected  by  transition  and  reverse  the
to ensure income for the poor and vulnerable  are  deterioration  in  social  outcomes.  The  interplay
adequately provided;  and (3) fiscal  risks, impinging on  between  fiscal  policies  and  institutional  arrangements
both expenditure  and revenue,  are managed through  is  increasingly  important  as  transition  economies
transition.  embark  on their  second  decade  of reforms.  In
The authors conclude  that while the quantitative  particular,  incentives  embedded  in  the  institutional
magnitude  of the fiscal adjustment was dramatic, the  arrangements  for  fiscal  management  needs  to  be
quality of this adjustment has compromised  the social  strengthened  so  that  policies,  resources,  and  outcomes
and economic objectives of transition, particularly  in the  can  be  better  aligned,  and  the  fiscal  adjustment  is
Commonwealth  of Independent States  (CIS).  They draw  consistent  with  qualitative  considerations.
four main conclusions:
* Investments  in public  services  fell in both absolute
and  relative  terms.
This paper-a  product  of the  Poverty  Reduction  and  Economic  Management  Sector  Unit,  Europe  and  Central  Asia
Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to understand  economic transition in former centrally planned economies.
Copies of the paper are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact
Alison  Panton,  room  H4-156,  telephone  202-458-5433,  fax  202-522-2751,  email  address  apanton@worldbank.org.
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may be contacted
at aalam@worldbank.org  or msundberg@worldbank.org.  May 2002.  (27 pages)
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help with  data.I.  INTRODUCTION
The emphasis in transition literature has been on explaining the growth performance of the
transition countries of Europe and Central  Asia.  Economic performance  among these economies
has differed widely and most of the analyses have centered on explaining these differences in
terms of the indicators of stabilization, structural reform, and initial conditions.'  At the start of
transition, fiscal imbalances quickly emerged as a key challenge to macroeconomic stabilization,
and were an inevitable result of lost revenues  for transfer-dependent  states of the former Soviet
Union,  the general collapse in incomes with concomitant loss in revenues, and additional
demands for expenditures.  Several factors further exacerbated these fiscal imbalances:  the
collapse of traditional  tax systems based on large public enterprises; the dissolution of the CMEA
trade system, the 'plan', and the monobank;2 the price shock from liberalization and
hyperinflation  which increased expenditure  demands on the budget; and the shift of economic
activities into the shadow economy with the resultant loss in revenues.
Globally, all countries face the challenge of fiscal adjustment,  be it in response to
unanticipated shocks, economic mismanagement,  or long term structural changes in the economy.
Fiscal adjustment is effected through a mix of measures to reduce expenditures,  strengthen
revenue mobilization,  and improve resource allocation and efficiency, often through institutional
and structural reforms.  What is different about fiscal adjustment in transitional economies are the
marked differences  in initial conditions relative to other developing countries.  There are at least
four major respects in which these differences  are pronounced:
*  The magnitude of the required fiscal adjustment necessary for macroeconomic
stabilization was far greater, often requiring a reduction in expenditures by as much as 20
percent or more of GDP in the initial years, especially in the CIS countries.  Moreover,
this fiscal retrenchnient had to take place in an environment of major and protracted
economic contraction  in the whole region;
*  The composition of expenditures required shifting from direct provision of most goods
and services, characteristic of state ownership and central planning, to more selective
provision or financing of only public goods  and services and ensuring distributive justice.
Moreover, the provision of public services and housing, which under central planning
was mainly through state-owned  enterprises, had to shift to either explicit government
financing, or private sector financing.  Budgets had to adjust rapidly to the changing
economic realities.  This required a massive reorientation of the role of the state, and
contrasts sharply from most developing  countries where the state, even if  dominant, has
not had as pervasive an influence  in the economy;
*  The instruments for revenue mobilization needed to be transformed  from direct
appropriation by controlling the terms of trade and through enterprise turnover taxes
(which were  unrelated to enterprise profitability or value-added, opaque, and highly
distortionary)  to a market-oriented  tax regime.  In contrast, most developing countries
have existing tax regimes based on modem instruments of indirect taxation; and
*  The extremely weak institutional legacy of budget and expenditure management
systems-with its lack of key budget institutions that would ensure the appropriate
matching of the costs of raising revenues with the benefits of expenditure programs.3
See, for instance, Fischer and Sahay (2000),  de Melo et al (2001)  and EBRD (1999).
2  See discussion in Tanzi and Tsibouris (1999).
3  See discussion in Hagen and Harden (1996).Key budgetary and financial  institutions which were underdeveloped  or non-existent
included a meaningful budgetary system or budget law, adequate financial intermediation
or bankruptcy laws to direct credit away from failing state enterprises to areas of growth,
a modem treasury system for managing the cash resources of the government  and
ensuring timely payments and financial reporting, and a modem tax administration and
legal structure for tax assessment and collection.  While these institutional weaknesses
are similar to many developing countries, the legacy of ubiquitous state control and a
political economy focused on total state control contrasts  sharply with the initial
conditions  in developing economies.
While early fiscal policy analyses of transition economies focused on quantitative
adjustment, there has been increasing emphasis in recent years on institutional issues and
qualitative dimensions of fiscal reform.  In the wake of the initial massive income shock and loss
of revenues, attention was necessarily given to adjustment through fiscal austerity, especially
expenditure  retrenchment.  Little attention was paid to distributive and efficiency  considerations
of fiscal reform where, in the absence of massive external  aid, counter-cyclical  fiscal policies
were not a feasible choice.  Since the mid-1990s, attention is increasingly being given to
qualitative  dimensions of the fiscal adjustment, i.e. the restructuring of public expenditures to
support private sector growth, and cushion the social costs of transition,  and the management of
fiscal risk.  Fiscal risks include the risk posed by contingent  fiscal liabilities;4 tax and payment
arrears, tax offsets, and other non-monetary instruments which have been persistent, distort
budgets, and undermine competitive restructuring of enterprises;5 the quality of public
expenditure management and the need for developing treasury systems, improved budgeting,
promoting performance  orientation;  the economic risks posed by falling educational  and health
outcomes; and the low levels of transparency and accountability in fiscal management.  This
shifting emphasis is already supporting  a richer policy dialogue promoting the pursuit of
economy, efficiency,  and effectiveness of public expenditures.
A recent and comprehensive  assessment of qualitative aspects of fiscal adjustment in the
transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, however, has not been undertaken.  An early
effort was made by Cheasty and Davis (1996) and more recently Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000) and
Gupta et al (2001).  Cheasty and Davis recorded the then uneven progress  on fiscal adjustment by
the states of the former Soviet Union, often exogenously forced by inelastic  financing.  They
recognized that the sharp reduction in deficits had contributed to stabilization but had also
resulted in sharp misalignment of expenditure  priorities and the expansion of unorthodox and
disorderly budget procedures. 6 This had compromised the quality of fiscal outcomes, caused
major expenditure inefficiency,  and showed little sign of significant budget restructuring.  Tanzi
and Tsibouris provide an overview of the fiscal reforms,  including institutional reforms in tax
policy, tax administration,  and expenditure management,  but they do not discuss the patterns,
outcomes, or 'quality' of fiscal adjustment.  Gupta et al assess the changes in the size and scope
of government in transition economies.  They conclude that while these governments have
retrenched in terms of public expenditures  in relation to GDP as well as in public sector
employment as a share of the population, various indicators suggest that government  size remains
high even as the scope of government is too broad.  While the paper does have some discussion
of issues relevant for quality of fiscal adjustment, the focus of the paper is more on the
quantitative aspects of adjustment and on the extent to which the scope of government has been
aligned with market needs.
4  See Brixi, Ghanem, and Islam (1999), Brixi, Papp, and Schick (1999).
5  Pinto et al (1999)  have analyzed the Russia situation is detail.
6  See Cheasty and Davis (1996).
2Many of the conclusions of these assessments remain valid and relevant, though a more
nuanced understanding of fiscal adjustment is needed.  The challenge for fiscal policy has been to
facilitate the economic transition, in particular the reallocation of resources from state-owned and
typically large enterprises  towards restructured  and new small and medium firms, while
continuing to provide priority public services and targeted transfers, and helping ensure that those
adversely  affected by the transition are taken care of.7 While there is no doubt that fiscal policy
remains central to transition,  the qualitative dimensions of fiscal adjustment-ensuring the
provision of basic public services, including social protection to the poor and the vulnerable, and
minimizing fiscal risk while maintaining a sustainable fiscal deficit-have become paramount.
Such an ordering of fiscal policy choices can only come about from the proper alignment of
incentives in the institutional  framework for budget management.  This interplay between the
institutional  and policy aspects is increasingly important as transition economies embark upon
their second decade of reforms.  Indeed, evidence suggests that even for those countries more
advanced in the transition process, strengthening the institutional framework for budget
management is equally important.  This paper seeks to take stock of the extent of fiscal
adjustment undertaken by the transition countries in the turbulent  initial decade of their shift
towards a market economy, and discusses both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of this
fiscal transition.  The paper then draws some lessons to guide future policymaking.
H.  THE EXTENT OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT
Any discussion of fiscal data on transition economies necessarily has to highlight two
challenges:  data deficiencies  (especially in the early years of transition)  and the significant
differences  in initial  conditions:
*  Data  Issues:  The absence of good government accounting systems and standard data
definitions puts the quality of fiscal data at serious risk.  An attempt has been made
here to provide some degree of comparability  and coverage  across the region.  The
paper draws mainly on data collected by the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department,
supplemented in some instances by World Bank sources.  Government expenditures
and revenues refer to consolidated expenditures of central and sub-national
governments,  including extra-budgetary  funds (such as pensions, road funds, and
social insurance  funds).  Expenditures and revenues presented in the paper are on a
cash basis and, therefore,  exclude arrears as well as quasi-fiscal  deficits (e.g. liabilities
arising from the banking system) and may consequently overstate fiscal balances.
Notwithstanding  these deficiencies,  and risking inevitable loss of precision, the
statistical  evidence nonetheless  sheds some light on the nature of the fiscal transition.
*  Initial  Conditions.  Large differences  in initial conditions inevitably impinged upon the
fiscal options as well  as the choices countries made.  All of the transition countries
started the  1  990s with a very limited private sector, an absence of well defined
commodity or factor markets, hence the absence of prices acting to signal scarcity, and
with a large state sector which dominated the economy and provided many public
services-housing,  schooling, medical care, etc.8 However, the initial conditions in the
central European and Baltic (CEB) countries were more favorable for a rapid transition
for several reasons.  On average, the private sector in the CEB countries was very
7  See World Bank, 2002, Transition:  The First Ten Years, for greater elaboration of this theme.
8  See de Melo, Denizer,  Gelb (1997), Lazear (1995), Berg et al (1998), Havrylyshyn and Van Rooden
(1999), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997).
3small (Poland had the highest share at 20 percent of GDP in 1991)  but still larger and
better poised to fill the gap left by collapsing state enterprises than was true of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.  A greater share of CEB trade
was already directed towards West Europe, and the collapse of the CMEA trade
arrangements  posed a less severe shock to their economies.  Moreover, selective
reform of state enterprises had been initiated since the 1980s in some of the CEB
economies (Hungary, Poland) softening management rigidities and dependence on the
state.  These differences help to partly explain the subsequent patterns of fiscal
adjustment.
Several  stylized facts emerge from an analysis of the fiscal data and are discussed below:
(i) All the transition  economies went through a dramaticfiscal  adjustment in aggregate
terms (see Figure  1).  The turnaround in fiscal imbalances has been especially remarkable  for the
CIS countries, which have reduced their average cash deficits from a high of 19 percent of GDP
in 1992 to a surplus of 0.7  percent by 2000.  The extent of this adjustment during this period is
more than fives times that of the CEB countries whose average deficit was reduced from about 7
percent to 3.2 percent over the same period.  Starting with much larger fiscal deficits,  the CIS
countries were compelled to make larger expenditure cuts.  Between  1992 and 2000, the average
reduction in expenditures in CIS countries was 23.1 percent of GDP as compared to 5.6 percent in
the CEB countries (see Table 1).  The picture is more compelling when one looks at the changes
in primary balances since interest expenditures have been growing during this period. While the
CEB countries have generally maintained balance on their primary budget, the CIS countries have
drastically reduced their large deficits of over  10 percent of GDP in 1992 to a surplus of over 4
percent of GDP by 2000.
Figure 1: Fiscal Contraction during Transition, 1992-00
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Source:  IMF and World Bank data;  Authors'  calculations
4Table 1: Total Budget Revenues  and Expenditures-change
in percentage points of GDP, 2000 over 1992
Revenues  Expenditures
CEB  -2.1  -5.6
CIS  -3.7  -23.1
Note:  All changes are based on population-weighted averages.
Source: Author's calculations
(ii)  The drastic  fiscal adjustment in the CIS countries  was necessitated  by a major revenue
shock at the start of transition. For many of the CIS countries, independence  from the Soviet
Union also meant the loss of large fiscal transfers from Moscow, which further compounded
declines in government revenues from recession and flawed tax systems with weak
administration.  While precise and comparable data on the extent of the loss in transfers from the
former Soviet Union are not available, some country examples are illustrative.  For instance,  in
1992, both Uzbekistan  and the Kyrgyz Republic  lost transfers from Moscow which were
equivalent to about 18 percent of GDP in 1991.  Other causes of the revenue decline were the
concentration of output loss in the traditional tax bases, revenue-losing tax reform, under-
utilization of the revenue potential of the energy sector, and the monetization of the implicit
subsidies.9
(iii) In the  face of  the sudden loss of  control over state resources in the CIS countries,
Governments had  no choice but to sharply cut expenditures (Figure 2).  For the CIS countries,
aggregate expenditures  fell from about 56 percent of GDP in 1992 to 33 percent of GDP in 2000;
for the CEB countries,  expenditures fell  from an average of 48 percent in 1992 to 42 percent in
2000.  In some cases, the expenditure cuts were dramatic: in Georgia,  general government
expenditure declined from around 36 percent of GDP in 1992 to just 12 percent in 1995 before
recovering to25 percent of GDP by 1998.
(iv) Since the 1998 financial  crisis,  fiscal balances  have improved sharply in the CIS
countries. Much of this is on account of the dramatic improvement in Russian finances, in large
part due to the boom in energy prices, the resultant income gains, and the growth in tax revenues
therefrom.  Other energy exporting countries in the CIS have likewise gained from this favorable
terms of trade development.  But this also reflects "leaming from the crisis" which inculcated in
policymakers a greater appreciation of the need to put public debt dynamics on a sustainable path
and greater political consensus on this issue.  This was reflected in marked changes in fiscal
behavior as countries sought to restrain expenditures,  manage extemal  debt more prudently,
including reduced exposure to interest sensitive short term debt, improve revenue collection, and
strengthen budget management.  The recent improved budgetary performance in the CIS countries
marks a departure with the pattem of change in some of the CEB countries (e.g. Poland) where
maintaining aggregate fiscal balance in the wake of growing public expenditures has become
more difficult to manage.
9  See Cheasty and Davis (1996) and the references therein for a fuller discussion of the causes and
consequences  of the revenue decline.  Gray (1998)  discusses underutilization of energy revenue potential in
the former Soviet Union and Baltic countries.Figure 2:
Expenciture Reductions  during Transition, 199200
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Source: IMF, World Bank data; Author's calculations
(v) By 2000 most countries had achieved manageable  budget deficits in the 2-4 percent of
GDP range, though there is significant variation  across countries. While most countries are
clustered in a narrow band, there are extremes--Russia's overall budget in 2000 posted a surplus
of about 3 percent of GDP while Albania's posted a deficit of 9 percent of GDP (see Figure 3).
While the genesis of these variations are of course different, recent years have shown a
convergence towards moderate budget deficits.  This picture is reinforced when one observes the
strong fiscal positions of many countries as reflected in the primary budget balances.
6on
0
%  of GDP
*000  boooo  -~~~~~~~~AloM
Albania  cm~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~lania
Kyrgyz~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~yy  Rpbi
0  AAbania
Armenia  C~~~~~~~~~~Kgzec  RepublIc  1
Urbkmeistan
Athuania  I
Azerbaijan  Sl~~~~~~~~~~~~~ova  eulicv
Uthuania  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~dwi
Siavak  Republic~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l
Latvia  020 
Slovak  cr  3 
Georgia  9TI
Estonia  !M  ueriin 
Belarus
Tajikistan  0)Ubksa









Macedonia,  Macedonia, FYR
Russian  Russian Federatin(vi) Revenues have now stabilized though inter-country variations  are significant. For the
CEB countries,  government revenues (population weighted) have stabilized at about 39 percent of
GDP, only one percent of GDP lower than early transition levels; for the CIS countries, revenues
fell from about 38 percent of GDP in 1992 to around  31 percent of GDP in 1999, and rose to 34%
in 2000 due largely to increased oil prices.  Country variations are marked (see Figure 4, with
simple averages).  The advanced market reformers,  which more readily adapted to markets and
had stronger economics  links to West Europe, have more readily sustained high tax collection
rates.  In Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland,  Slovakia,  and Slovenia, tax to GDP
rations were in the 40-45 percent range in 2000-comparable  to tax collection rates in some
advanced high-income  countries, and probably too high to be sustainable,  as suggested by Figure
5.  (Belarus is the only other country in transition to have comparable revenue ratios).  Many of
the CIS countries have very low tax collections.  In previously war-torn  Georgia, for example,
government revenues dropped to 7 percent of GDP in 1995  before recovering to about 16 percent
of GDP by 2000.  Similarly, Turkmenistan,  Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan had revenues of
about  14 and 17 percent of GDP in 2000.
Figure 4:
Revenue  Mobilization  in CEB  and CIS  Countries, 2000
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Source:  IMF; author's calculations  (averages  are unweighted).
(vii) Expenditures show variations  among countries and  particularly  between the CIS and
CEB countries. Expenditure  levels are typically higher in CEB countries, on account of higher
social expenditures  (discussed below).  Expenditures vary from a low of 14 percent of GDP in
Tajikistan to over 50 percent of GDP in Croatia and Hungary (Figure 5), approaching the higher
levels found in OECD countries.  For some of the poorer countries in the CIS, foreign aid inflows
have helped maintain expenditures at levels higher that would have been possible.
8Figure 5:
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Source:  IMF: author's calculations (averages are unweighted).
(viii) The larger relative  quantitative  adjustment in the CIS countries also reflects larger
'imbalances' in expenditure levels relative to income level.  Relative to their average income
level, the size of government in the CIS countries reveals a far greater magnitude of expenditure
cuts during transition to a market system.  Figure 6 shows the average share of Government
expenditure to GDP, relative to the log of per capita income.  The trend line represents the
regression of size of government on log of per capita income  (PPP adjusted to correct for major
exchange rate distortions) across a sample of developed and developing countries for which
comparable  fiscal data was available in 2000.  The simple relationship shows the increasing  size
of Government with per capita income level (commonly called Wagner's law), around which
there is considerable variation.




e  25_  ~







2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  5
LOG of Per capita Income PPP based
Trendline: Y=1.7 X - *.0,  with R
2=O.3 .Based on a sample of 49 developed and developing countries vwith  comparable
fiscal data.  Source:  World Bank, IM  F, and Authors  calculations
Source:  IMF; World  Bank; Authors'  calculations
9The changes in the levels of expenditure  in the CIS and CEB country groups  for 1992 and
2000 (using simple averages) are also shown relative to the trend line.  It is noteworthy that both
the CIS and CEB countries were at expenditure levels comparable to OECD economies in 1992
(exceeding  45 percent of GDP), and show a sharp deviation from the cross country trend line.
However, by 2000, their relative positions had diverged quite strikingly.  The massive
expenditure cuts in the CIS countries brought them to a point right along the regression line for
their income level, at around 28 percent of GDP.  The much more modest contraction in the CEB
countries, however,  shows them still well above the regression  line, indicating the persistent large
size of govemment relative to their income  levels.  This suggests that further reduction in the size
of government in CEB countries may be warranted (particularly with respect to expenditures on
the social insurance programs that may prove difficult to sustain), although this is fundamentally
a question of socio-political preferences and sustainability.
III.  THE QUALITY OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT
Given the dramatic size of the fiscal adjustment, what can we say about its quality?  Recent
literature on fiscal adjustment has emphasized the quality aspects along three dimensions-the
extent to which (i) pro-growth expenditures that are essential for the creation of future economic
and social assets are maintained or protected, (ii) pro-poor  expenditures, such as poverty-targeted
transfers, necessary to ensure income streams for the poor and the vulnerable are adequately
provided for; and (iii)flscal risks, impinging upon both expenditures  and revenues, are reduced
or, at least, contained.  These categories are of course not mutually exclusive, and it is easy to
think of ways in which pro-growth  expenditures,  for instance in rural infrastructure,  can also be
pro-poor by enabling better access to markets  and reducing transport costs for the rural poor.
Better targeting of pro-poor expenditures can help reduce the level of expenditures  and strengthen
fiscal discipline, thereby improving prospects for macroeconomic  stabilization and growth.  A
better management of the fiscal risks ensures that  risks of periodic bouts of macro instability with
high inflation and economic and social costs-in which the poor typically suffer
disproportionately, and which undermine growth prospects-are reduced.
A.  Protecting Pro-Growth Expenditures
Three groups of expenditures  are considered  here: human capital investments in education
and in health as reflected by levels of public expenditures, and capital expenditures on the
creation and maintenance of the country's fixed capital stock.  Such a nomenclature is necessarily
limiting for it implies that public expenditures in human and physical  investments are critical for
growth.  What is missed here are total expenditures  in the economy in these areas which would
include both public and private expenditures.  Indeed, private expenditures on health, education,
and physical  investments have become more important in transition economies,  and may well be
offsetting  any decline in public expenditures.  Moreover, other forms of capital-such as social
capital-may also be necessary components of a growth strategy.  However,  such a narrowing of
scope is essential here in order to keep the discussion manageable and focused.
(a)  Public Expenditures in Education
The fiscal adjustment  in the region has taken place in part at the cost of cutting education
services even as most countries have tried to protect spending on education.'°  While comparable
time series data is not available, given the large declines in output in all the countries, and the
to  In relative terms, education spending increased.  See World Bank, 2000, ibid. Chapter. 7.
10retrenchment in aggregate expenditures,  the real value of expenditures  on education fell.
However, expenditure levels were maintained as a share of smaller GDP's in most countries."
The cuts in real expenditure  are reflected in deterioration in indicators of learning
opportunity,  access, quality, and coverage.'2 Though education outcomes are still much higher
that those found in countries of similar income levels, some of the CIS countries show significant
declines in enrollment rates for pre-school, basic education, upper secondary education  as well as
vocational and technical education though there has been some recovery in rates in some
countries with the recent pick-up in economic  growth. In the poorest countries-Moldova,
Armenia, Georgia,  and Tajikistan-enrollment rates fell by about 10 percentage  points or more
during the past decade.  Essential expenditures on operation and maintenance inputs-such  as on
textbooks,  school supplies, and building maintenance-were  squeezed.  For instance,  in Ukraine,
allocations for textbooks fell by 70 percent between  1995 and 1998, and capital maintenance
dried up even as the number of teachers expanded.  Poorer regions have been forced to bear a
disproportionate share of the adjustment.  For instance, in Georgia, reportedly 43 percent of
primary and secondary schools in urban areas got textbooks for all children compared with only
27 percent in poorer rural areas. In Russia,  where regions have responsibility over most
educational funding, richer regions have been able to spend more on education while poorer
regions have had to struggle to maintain the basic requirements,  contributing to the rise in income
inequality.'3 Declining public expenditures  in education have also shifted costs to households.
While this may be a more efficient solution, concem arises from the growth of informal payments
for publicly provided services, and the burden this creates  for the poor, limiting their access to
education  services.
Despite budget pressures and falling enrollment rates, teaching staff has grown in many
countries.  In Russia the number of teachers expanded by 25 percent between  1989 and 1996,  and
in Central Asia, increases range up to 25 percent.'4 Student-teacher  ratios are typically very low
(for instance, 8.7 in Armenia, 9.9 in Azerbaijan, and 11.9 in Russia)  and it is widely held that this
can be increased without compromising teaching quality or learning outcomes.  Using OECD
standards as a benchmark,  up to a third of the teaching labor force can be reduced.  However,
policy makers have typically chosen to cut less politically  sensitive outlays on operations  and
maintenance,  and have deferred necessary capital repairs and energy efficiency improvements,
rather than take the politically difficult step of laying off teachers and other state employees.
The real cuts in education expenditures  have occurred even as cost pressures have
remained high; little has been done to re-allocate towards more productive uses.  High energy
costs-which in some of the colder CIS countries absorbs 30-50 percent of expenditure outlays-
is a significant cost burden on the sector.  There has been only limited effort towards reducing
energy costs through energy conservation incentives and investments in energy efficiency
measures.  Additional pressures on the public purse have come from other sources.  In countries
such as Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan, budgetary resources are inadequate to meet
the fiscal requirements  of universal  education coverage.  In almost all countries, rising tertiary
education enrollments-which  reflects the demand for higher human capital in transition
economies-risks absorbing larger shares of education budgets unless tertiary education is
financed through increasing cost recovery, reduction of unit costs, and private sector delivery.
"  Inplicitly,  this means that part of the 'peace dividend' in reduced defense expenditures has gone
towards reducing the burden of adjustrnent on education (and other public) services.
12  For a fuller discussion of these issues, see World Bank (2000), chapter 7.
3  See World Bank (1999).
"4  Klugman (1999)  and World Bank (1999).
1  1The past practice of public financing and provision  for these services is no longer viable.'5 Even
as falling preschool and basic education enrollment rates have led to low utilization rate of
schools and high maintenance costs, adequate  savings have not been generated by consolidating
schools and rationalizing teaching  staff which can help generate  savings to more selectively
finance operations and maintenance requirements, including unmet demand for textbooks and
school  supplies.
Notwithstanding the real cuts in education expenditures, levels of such expenditures  as a
share of GDP remain high compared to other countries of the same income level.  At the end of
the  1990s, both CEB and CIS countries maintained expenditures at around 4.6 percent of GDP
(see Table 2).  This compares quite favorably to low and middle income countries with average
education  spending of 2.9 percent and 3.5 percent of GDP respectively whereas high income
countries averaged 4.8 percent of GDP, roughly the same as the CEB and CIS averages.  This, of
course, masks significant variation in expenditures across the region as public spending on
education ranges from under 2 percent of GDP for Armenia and Georgia to almost 8 percent of
GDP for Uzbekistan.'6 Some CIS countries, particularly those with the sharpest aggregate
expenditure adjustments, were forced to cut their education outlays  sharply, while the slowest
reformers among the CIS group (Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)  have sustained higher
spending levels.
Table 2: Selected  Public Spending (% of GDP)
Education  Health  Social Protection
CEB  4.6  5.1  13.3
CIS  4.6  3.6  7.4
Europe & Central Asia  4.1  4.0  --
East Asia & Pacific  1.7  1.7  --
South Asia  3.1  0.9  --
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.7  1.7  --
Low Income  2.9  1.2  --
Middle Income  3.5  2.5  --
High Income  4.8  6.1  --
Notes:  Simple averages have been used for the regional averages.  Data is for
most recent year which varies by country.
Source:  World Bank
(b)  Public Expenditures in Health
Public expenditures in health also fell in real terms during transition with the decline in
national incomes, but-like with education expenditures-most  countries also made an effort to
protect these expenditures in relative terms.  Budgetary health expenditures as a share of GDP
have been remarkably stable across the decade, with average expenditure  levels in 1998-99 which
were close to, or even above, expenditure  shares at the beginning of the  1  990s (Figure 7).  As a
share of total public spending,  health outlays have increased  significantly over the decade.  These
expenditure levels are well above the average spending of low and middle income countries,
reflecting the legacy of universal public health care coverage (Table 2).  There is a wide disparity
in public health expenditures,  however, within the region,  from below I percent of GDP in
'5  The young demographic profiles of these countries imply potentially larger future cohorts for higher
education.  This highlights the growing importance of cost containment.
16  For more discussion and data, see World Bank (2000), chapter 7.
12Georgia to over 8 percent of GDP in Croatia, exceeding typical OECD expenditure  levels.  Public
health expenditures are clearly inadequate in several CIS countries where spending has been
dramatically cut.'7
Figure 7
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Though transition countries have better health indicators in most cases than other countries
of similar income levels-reflecting the universal provision of comprehensive  health care
services and high levels of education-  disturbing evidence of worsening health outcomes has
emerged.'8 Male life expectancy fell by around four years between  1989 and the mid-1990s in
the Baltic countries,  and by five years in Russia, Ukraine,  and Kazakhstan.  Immunization rates
have fallen in several countries-and at disproportionately  higher rates for the poor.  Thus, in
Kazakhstan, while only 40 percent of the children in the poorest quintile have been immunized,
the equivalent ratio is 80 percent for the highest 40 percent of the population.  In Russia, Ukraine,
and Moldova, previously rare communicable  diseases, such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, have
become serious threats to public health.  With rising poverty levels, other public health problems
are emerging.  For instance, in parts of Central Asia, undemutrition in children under five years
of age is leading to higher rates of stunting and wasting.  Similarly, micronutrient  malnutrition is
causing higher rates of anemia among women of reproductive  age, particularly in the poorer Aral
Sea region of Kazakhstan  and Uzbekistan.
Moreover,  declining public health expenditures  shifts health costs to families which may
discourage access to health services by the poor. While wealthy famnilies, particularly in urban
areas, can afford side payments or private health care alternatives,  the poor are often forced to sell
assets, borrow funds, or forgo services altogether.  In the Kyrgyz Republic, for instance, three-
quarters of all patients in 1996 made informal payments and one-third of all patients seeking
inpatient services had to borrow money.  Similar figures  are reported for Georgia, Tajikistan,  and
Ukraine.  In Russia, data from 1997 suggests that 41 percent of all Russian patients could not
afford to purchase required drugs and  11 percent could not afford any medical treatment.
Similarly,  37 percent of pregnant women in Tajikistan could not afford pre-natal care,  and almost
one-third of births occurred at home, a break from past practices of hospital births.
17  More details are provided in World Bank (2000),  chapter 7.
18  See World Bank (2000) Chapter 8, for further details.
13For most countries in the region, even with high levels of public expenditures, the intra-
sectoral allocation of health expenditures remain low.  Historically,  the region has emphasized
investment in hospital care and large medical facilities, with far higher hospital bed-to-population
ratios than in high income countries.  But now, financing needs to shift away from the
maintenance of this large hospital infrastructure  and specialist care towards providing basic health
services particularly to the poor, for whom access to quality basic healthcare has seriously
deteriorated.  Financial incentives for health services workers are poor, encouraging demands  for
side payments  for services, including payment for drugs and medical supplies. Over-staffing  is
evident from the high health sector employment as compared with OECD averages.'9 Health
sector employment in countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan is around 6.5 percent of
total employment while the OECD average is only 4.3 percent.  In Russia and Ukraine, there are
4.5 and 4.3 physicians respectively per 1000 persons compared with an OECD average of  2.6.
Wage bills in health care have consequently increased as other health expenditures have fallen.
In Ukraine, the share of wages in health sector outlays increased  from 36 percent to 46 percent
over 1995-98,  while the share spent on medicines  fell from 12 percent to 7 percent.  At the same
time the real wages of health workers have plummeted to one-quarter of their 1992 levels. There
also remains wastage of resources on half-empty  facilities, poorly insulated buildings, or
dysfunctional  machines.  Sixty percent of the health budget in Moldova is spent on utilities due,
in part, to the large excess capacity of hospitals and other medical facilities.  The infrastructure
downsizing program of Georgia is an example of how a sizeable reduction  in beds and sale of
unused buildings and facilities has led to a consolidation of  the infrastructure.
Technical inefficiencies  in health expenditures remain high and are reflected in high unit
costs of treatment.  One key source derives from long hospitalization stays.  The average length
of state in a hospital  for acute care is  16 days in CIS countries compared with 6 days in Western
Europe.  Hospitals in many of these countries have incentives to keep patients for longer duration
since this partly determines hospital budgets.  Establishing norms for hospitalization,  and
removing perverse budget incentives,  is needed.  Moreover,  there remains undue emphasis on
hospital  and specialist  care though this is now shifting  to outpatient and  preventative care.
Greater emphasis on outpatient  services and preventive health care,  such as infant immunization,
prevention of infectious diseases, and reducing "life style" induced health problems, can reduce
costs and free up resources.  The shift from specialists to family medicine practitioners,  occurring
in much of the region, will lower costs.
(c) Physical  Investment Expenditures
For most countries,  overall expenditure cuts  fall most heavily on public investment and
discretionary current expenditures, such as outlays on operations and maintenance.  Forced fiscal
austerity in the transition countries has similarly led to shrinking investment in physical assets as
a share of GDP for most countries.  This has occurred against a background of rising investment
needs during transition, and sharply deteriorating  infrastructure.
Data are not available for the early years of transition though  some country case studies
reveal serious declines (at least initially) and disparities in levels of capital expenditures.  In
Russia, capital expenditures of the overall government halved from about 7 percent of GDP in
1989 to 3.5 percent of GDP in 1999.2o  In Ukraine, capital expenditures fell from 4.6 percent of
GDP in 1994 to less than  1  percent in 1997.2'  In Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,  public investments
'9  See World Bank (2000).
20  World Bank, 2001, Russia: Improving the Efficiency of Public Investment Expenditures,  Report No.
22693-RU.
21  World Bank,  1997, Ukraine Public  Investment Review, Report No.  16399-UA.
14had fallen to 2 percent of GDP by 1998-99.  In some countries such as Estonia, public investment
fell in the first two years of transition to 1.4 percent of GDP before rebounding to around 5
percent of  GDP by 1999.22  Even as the initial stock of physical infrastructure was aging and in
decline at the start of transition, the subsequent decline in public investments has led to further
deterioration in the stock of physical capital and has deferred investments in new assets. With the
exceptions of Belarus and Uzbekistan (not shown), the CIS countries generally have levels of
public investment lower than those of the countries of CEB even though many of the latter are
more  advanced reformers and attract higher levels of private investment.  Current levels of public
investmnent are widely dispersed, as expected, from lows of under 2 percent of GDP in
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to highs of 11.6 percent in Belarus (see Figure 8)  where the vestiges of
socialist state control remain most entrenched.  However, these figures may not fully capture off-
budget investment outlays which may be significant in some countries.
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It is difficult to determine, ex ante, the adequacy of current levels of public  investments.
This depends on many country-specific  factors including the current capital stock,  its quality, the
regulatory environment and investnent climate, the availability of financing,  and the
development  strategy of the country.  However, it is clear that investment needs in infrastructure
and replacement of manufacturing equipment are high, while investment levels on average are
below the public investment levels in OECD countries (at over 4 percent of GDP) with much
higher levels of private investment.  In several industries, where physical infrastructure  is
important to promote the efficiency of production, marketing and distribution,  security and
incentives  for private investment are not adequate, and public investment is needed to 'crowd in'
new private investment and revitalize the industrial  base.  This requires a change in the
'philosophy'  of public investments-away from centralized investment planning towards a
partnership with the private  sector, with clear criteria for state intervention, with rigorous analysis
of expenditure priorities and tradeoffs.  This is lacking in most countries.  For instance, in
Uzbekistan, almost half of public investment in the 2000 Budget went to building post-secondary
22  World Bank,  1997, Estonia  Public Expenditure Review, Report No. 1 6420-EE
15vocational colleges and lyceums with little discussion of the opportunity cost of these investments
such as the economic and social costs of deferring critical investment in Uzbekistan's  crumbling
irrigation  system on which the main export crop (cotton) and a substantial part of the population
depends.
B.  Protecting Pro Poor Expenditures
The magnitude of the cuts in the transition countries meant that the burden of  the cuts had
to be felt by all sectors, including social transfers.23 The dramatic nature of the income decline
and attendant increase in poverty and unemployment in the transition economies in Europe and
Central Asia have highlighted the challenge of providing effective  social protection.  Previous
mechanisms of social protection which focused on those with special needs have either become
irrelevant, unaffordable,  or difficult to administer.24 Under central planning, the state provided
full protection against income risks over an individual's lifetime through employment while of
working age, and through pensions and social assistance  for those retired or unable to work.  With
transition to the market, job security vanished, and risks of unemployment and poverty rose
sharply.
The transition countries have adopted two broad approaches  to addressing these risks. The
European transition countries-where  the institutional and administrative capacity is stronger,
and where economic restructuring  is more advanced-let employment levels adjust and used
generous social protection to lay off workers and to protect the pensioners and the disabled.  These
countries also adopted means-testing for social assistance payments, and began modernizing their
pension systems through the introduction of  multipillar systems.  Real wages and real transfers
have been rising in these countries.  In contrast, the Eurasian countries sought to protect
employment and forestall restructuring,  even if that meant a sharper erosion of real wages and
pensions.  Pension and social assistance arrears have been pernicious, hurting their intended poor
beneficiaries,  and subsidies for housing and utilities have been generalized with little effort at
targeting.  Groups dependent on institutionalized care have often fared the worst, living in
miserable conditions with dwindling public support.  Informalization  of labor markets has been
the norm.
As a result, current levels of public  expenditures  on social protection are almost two times
higher as a share of GDP in the CEB countries than in the CIS countries (Table 2 above). A
comparison of pension expenditures-the  largest share of social protection expenditures-in
selected transition countries with OECD expenditures  suggest that most European transition
economies spend as much on pensions as OECD countries though it may be high evert in some of
the Eurasian countries (see Figure 9).  Time series and cross country data is not available which
would permit an analysis of trends in expenditures  for different categories of social protection
though anecdotal and country case studies provide valuable insights into the problems and the
diversity of country experiences.  In Georgia,  for instance,  aggregate expenditures  cuts meant that
pension payments fell to about 0.8 percent of GDP in  1994 before recovering to close to 2 percent
of GDP, still a very low level.  In contrast, Poland has public pension expenditures  close to 14
percent of GDP.  In Russia, pension expenditures in 2001  were equivalent to 5.6 percent of GDP.
23  Other transmission channels have also affected the poor adversely.  For instance,  the spread of
informal  and under-the-table  payments hurt the poor, who have less capacity to pay,  more than they hurt
the rich.  The emergence of pervasive arrears  in public-sector payments,  wages and pensions in parts of the
CIS (e.g.,  Georgia, Moldova,  Russia) are also highly regressive as they fall disproportionately on the poor
and are highest in poorer regions.
24  See World Bank (2000b) for an evaluation of transitional experience  with social protection
mechanisms and strategies.
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The challenge of rationalizing  social protection expenditures remains huge.  For this,
benefits must be adjusted to affordable levels and strictly limited to target groups, while aiming to
minimize errors of inclusion and exclusion.  Even in these poorer economies, targeting of cash
benefits can be achieved through several instruments,  including through life line tariffs, self-
selection approaches, geographic  and community targeting,  as well as through indicators of
income or income proxies.  De-institutionalization  in some instances, where family and
community support structures are intact, may also be beneficial.  Ultimately, cost efficiency
measures will help but not overcome the problem of under-funding,  which must be redressed
through reallocation of public funds.
Reform of social protection  schemes often provokes political opposition.  Flattening of
social benefits, for example, is often seen as unfair by those who have contributed more from
their incomes to the consolidated  fund, as Georgia's recent experience has shown.  Hence,
managing the political opposition,  and maintaining adequate support to politically sensitive
schemes, is a constraint that many governments  in the region face.  Governments  will need to
strengthen  technical capacity for actuarial forecasts of pension expenditures  and revenues,
auditing of pension funds, and analysis of fund collection problems in order to reduce the risks of
faulty design and weak implementation.
C.  Reducing Fiscal Risks
The reduction of fiscal risks to manageable levels is also a key dimension of the quality of
fiscal adjustment.  However, the trends in the transition economies are mixed.  While the
transition to market economy has led to the emergence of new types of fiscal risks, it has also
provided th'e policymakers  with new instruments for managing them.  Four sources of fiscal risks
are addressed here:  contingent liabilities, payment arrears and budgetary offsets,  institutional
17arrangements  for budget management, growing external debt service burden, and the drain from
military spending.
(a)  Contingent Liabilities
The reported fiscal adjustment does not accurately reflect actual  adjustment.  As recent
literature  on the subject demonstrates,  there are many ways in which governments  can comply
with the quantitative targets for revenues and expenditures by switching to hidden liability
accumulation  or asset diminution.25  For most transition (and developing)  economies, budget
deficits or surpluses constitute only a portion of the total change  in government liabilities, much
of which derives from the realization of  contingent liabilities,  macroeconomic volatility, and
quasi-fiscal operations of the government.  These contingent liabilities arise from  various sources.
The largest source of these are the liabilities of state-owned enterprises and the financial system
which industrial  and bank restructuring and privatization programs seek to address with attendant
large fiscal costs.  More recent risks arise from government guarantees for enterprise borrowings,
social insurance schemes (pensions, medical  insurance), and local government borrowings.
Pension liabilities are of particular concern as demographic trends under defined benefit schemes
make current arrangements fiscally unaffordable."
Contingent fiscal liabilities are very attractive  since they provide a hidden source of
financing,  often substituting for direct government finances to sustaining economic outcomes.  In
the process, however,  they compromise future fiscal stability by generating sudden and
unanticipated claims on the budget.  Indeed, results from cross country regressions  suggest that
the increase in average implied deficits (i.e. after including hidden liabilities) is strongly
correlated with currency crises even as no such relationship is found between the conventional
deficit and currency crises.27 While even OECD countries have large contingent liabilities,  the
vulnerability of  these CEB countries to such fiscal risks is exacerbated by several factors
including the prevalence of less clear ownership  structures, underdeveloped regulatory
frameworks, weaker enforcement of laws, shallow and nascent domestic debt markets with weak
information disclosure,  and limited risk management capacity.
Different approaches have been made to attempt to quantify these "hidden" liabilities and
deficits.28 The magnitudes of these contingent liabilities, even if only partially accounted for, are
sizeable.  For instance,  in the Czech Republic,  estimates of such hidden deficits are close to 8
percent of GDP of which explicitly and implicitly guaranteed loans accounted for about half.  29
Oftentimes,  these liabilities hit the budget in a significant manner.  In Bulgaria, government
borrowings to help finance failing enterprises cost the government  an estimated  13 percent of
GDP over 1994-96. The fiscal costs of bank restructuring-some of which was prompted by
banking crises-have ranged from 0.9 percent of GDP in Latvia to 22.0 percent of GDP in
25  See, for instance, Easterly (1998), Polackova (1998),  or Kharas and Mishra (1999). A
comprehensive  assessment of  fiscal adjustment needs to incorporate the net change in govermment assets
and liabilities (including contingent liabilities).
26  There is a parallel with financial savings that were substantially wiped out by inflation and banking
crises during the early years of transition, for which some governments may feel a liability.
27  See Kharas  and Mishra (1999)
28  See, for instance,  Burnside et al (1998) and Davis et al (1997) and Kharas and Mishra (1999).
29  World Bank,  1999,  Czech Republic-Toward  EUAccession, Washington,  D.C.Bulgaria. 0 In Slovakia, the stock of bonds to replace the bad loans of the banking sector will is
estimated to cost around  12 percent of GDP.
The growth of large public and publicly-guaranteed borrowings pose a particular problem
for some of the poorest countries in the region, and constitute a serious fiscal risk.  This is most
pronounced for the poorer CIS countries-Armenia,  Georgia,  the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,
and Tajikistan-where the total external debt burden in 2000 ranges from about 45 percent of
GDP in Armenia to almost 140 percent of GDP in the Kyrgyz Republic.  The net present value of
future debt-service payments exceeds 150 percent of exports in Georgia, Armenia, and the
Kyrgyz Republic, and do not appear sustainable.3'  The CEB countries have seen smaller
increases in interest costs and with stronger growth, export, and revenue performance,  the
economic burden has been more manageable. The rapid growth of external debt in some of the
transition countries reflects several factors-including  low growth, high current account deficits,
and high interest rates-as well as the poor quality of fiscal adjustment policies. This has negated
a positive initial condition for the CIS countries which emerged from the collapse of  the Soviet
Union with little external debt (as Russia took over these liabilities) and very low debt service
payments.  The rising debt servicing costs have reduced the fiscal space for discretionary
expenditures  at the same time that revenues have declined.
Recognition of the problems posed by contingent liabilities, and policies to control them,
have, however, shown considerable progress in some countries in recent years.  This has been
most notable in the CEB countries:  Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia have opted for rapid sell-off of
commercial  banks rather than risk direct fiscal costs from rescuing them from banking crises.
Hungary undertook pension reforms early which raised budget deficits temporarily but reduced
long-term public pension liability.  Moreover,  even as the Government has taken  on new fiscal
risks in the form of state guarantees and growing programs of credit, it has dealt with these
programs in a fiscally prudent and transparent manner.32 Across the CIS countries as well there is
progress towards greater transparency in budgeting to incorporate extra-budgetary  funds into
official budgets, and adopt new Budget Codes incorporating fiscal management  reforms (Russia,
Kazakhstan).  Several  countries are in the midst of reforming their pension system to place them
on a sustainable financial basis, including Russia which recently announced a major program of
pension reform including formation of a defined contribution program.  Indeed a new wave of
fiscal reforms aimed at reducing fiscal risk and imparting  greater transparency to the budget
process appears to have gained momentum towards the end of the first decade in transition.33
(b) Quasi Fiscal Activities
Even as some quasi-fiscal activities,  such as off-budget  funds and implicit subsidies, have
been gradually incorporated into budget as an explicit fiscal measures, problems have remained.
Wage and payments arrears have remained problematic in several CIS countries.  Implicit
subsidies to support failing enterprises and social assets devolved from pubic enterprises
(housing, schools, health clinics, sanitoria) have continued in large part due to the failure of
formal social  safety nets and the political pressures to maintain employment in the large  state
sector.  Even as revenue reforms have sought to reduce tax exemptions,  tax expenditures remain a
30  Tang et al (2000).  It is difficult to unbundle the fiscal costs from re-capitalization needs (as a result
of structural reforms in banking) from government  financing (to rescue banks from crises)  as banking crises
normally result from structural  and institutional weaknesses  in the banking sector.
31  See World Bank (200 lb).
32  Brixi et al (1999)
33  Martinez  and Boex (2000) describe a 'third period' of  fiscal management reform in transition
countries in transition countries that aims to impose greater fiscal discipline and hard budget constraints on
governments.
19key element of industrial policy in many countries. Budgetary offsets developed sharply in the
mid-I 990s as a way for many CIS countries to cope with the fiscal crises. Under-pricing  of
utilities services provides subsidies to consumers while taxing the utility providers.
Although arrears and the use of non-monetary instruments have been more prevalent in
Russia and other CIS countries, especially in the mid-1990s, they have declined in use and
importance as the deleterious  effects from these practices became evident.  The problem of non-
payments emerged most starkly in Russia,  fueled by an inconsistent macro-micro policy mix of
tight monetary targets, rapid disinflation, but weak fiscal discipline and soft budget constraints on
enterprises and public utilities.34 From 1995  to 1998, the Russian Govemment sought to achieve
rapid stabilization by fixing the exchange rate and tightening credit within the overall expenditure
targets.  But inadequate expenditure provisions (e.g. for public sector energy bills), rigidities in
reallocation, and intense pressure to maintain state support in select sectors led to the use of
arrears as a 'normal'  financing mechanism.  This led to increased public borrowings through the
domestic T-bill market, increasing fiscal pressures on government  from debt service.  Political
pressure  to maintain subsidies to the largely bankrupt state enterprise sector (essentially  social
safety nets for these public employees), led to the use of arrears, non-cash settlements,  and
elaborate 'offset' procedures estimated to total 7-10 percent of GDP over 1995-97.  Between
1994 and  1997 offsets increased from 11  percent to 24 percent of federal budget revenues, before
declining thereafter.  The web of non-payments led to chronic tax arrears, particularly from energy
monopolies passing on their non-payments problem to govemment.  As confidence in economic
management plummeted, interest rates soared and precipitated  the financial meltdown of 1998.
Implicit subsidies also remain widespread, particularly in the housing and energy sector,
through arrears to consumers,  deferred payments, low cash collections, and utility tariffs which
do not adequately compensate  the utilities for the economic cost of service provision.  This
effectively  taxes these sectors and undermines their financial soundness,  acting as a disincentive
to investments in the energy sector, and contributing  to the deterioration of the energy
infrastructure.  In Azerbaijan, the quasi-fiscal  activities in the energy sector (primarily from under-
pricing and nonpayments)  amounted to 22 percent of GDP in  1999.35
Tax expenditures-preferential  tax exemptions or reductions to support specific  sectors or
activities-have also increased in many countries,  often because they are less visible than direct
subsidies and often can be passed with executive approval bypassing legislative oversight.  In
Poland the value of tax expenditures grew by an estimated 32 percent per year between  1992 and
1998,  and were highly regressive.36 Foregone revenues from tax exemptions are pervasive.  In
Kyrgyzstan,  it is estimated that tax exemptions cost the budget the equivalent of 5-7 percent of
GDP.  Arbitrary tax exemptions in Russia granted by federal and sub-national authorities  are
costly and seriously  distort the tax base.
In summary, while comprehensive  data on arrears, nonpayments,  tax expenditures,  and
implicit subsidies are hard to come by for the region, their prevalence  appears to have increased
in the mid-i 990s in part due to the failure of formal social safety nets in the CIS countries.  As
reform has deepened,  efforts to tackle these problems  and reduce economic  distortions have
increased,  and their incidence  has generally declined across most countries.
34  See Pinto et al (1999)  for a detailed exposition of the non-payments problem and its origins,
including the flawed fiscal adjustrnent.
35  Petri et al, (2001)
36  See Cavalcanti and Li (2000).
20(c)  Institutional Reforms in Budget Management
The transition economies  started with grossly inadequate systems of budget management
which has posed a serious challenge for understanding the fiscal  situation, understanding the cost
and benefits of public policy measures  as well as the tradeoffs implicit in public policy choices,
and budgeting for results.  Given the low starting point, institutional reforms in budget
management, addressing both revenue and expenditure management,  have been a common
feature of the fiscal transition.
Tax Policy and Tax Administration.  The transition during the  1990s also brought about an
overhaul of the tax system in many countries, with the introduction of new and more efficient
instruments of taxation.37 The reform of tax policy and institutions became essential to the fiscal
adjustment.  The overall burden of taxation has been reduced.  Tax collections saw a shift from
direct taxes towards indirect taxes, and, within direct taxes, towards personal income taxes.38 At
the same time, the efficiency of the tax system was enhanced as introduction of value-added
taxation became a central part of the tax system in most countries, although problems with design
and implementation have been persistent in some countries.39 While deficiencies  in tax policy
remain-for instance in the use of the origin basis for VAT taxation by Russia, the non-use of
accrual basis for VAT taxation, lack of appropriate deductions from enterprise income for tax
purposes, and the high payroll tax of around 35 percent for most CIS countries40-tax policy
improvements  have been substantial  and in many countries  compare favorably with modem day
standards.  However,  even as progress has been made on tax policy issues, progress has lagged on
tax administration which remains weak and fragmented in all of these countries and is the most
important constraint today to improved revenue collection.  This is particularly true in federated
countries with a tiered tax collection  structure.  4
Inter-Governmental Fiscal  Relations.  Public revenue and expenditure reforms through
transition have fundamentally transformed the fiscal landscape  of public finance between levels
of government.  However,  problems have developed.  In several countries expenditure
responsibilities were devolved to sub-national governments, along with new mandates, but
without fully revisiting the basis for expenditure and revenue assignments.  This has led to inter-
government fiscal imbalances,  and has prevented the advanced reforming countries  from fully
exploiting the potential public finance  and service delivery benefits from decentralization.
In larger countries with federal structures, such as Russia and Ukraine, unclear revenue
assignments and expenditure obligations in the face of a weakening state made fiscal
37  See Tanzi and Tsibouris (1999),  Ebril and Havrylyshyn (1999) or Martinez-Vazquez  and McNab
(2000) for more on the tax reforms in transition countries.  In the pre-transition economies,  (i) most tax
revenue  was generated from three major sources-the  tumover tax, the enterprise tax, and the payroll tax;
(ii) taxation of  resources and indirect subsidies were implicit in the state allocation of under-priced
resources  (relative to international  prices); (iii) government payments were processed through the state's
monobank;  and (iv) the 'plan' formed the basis for the budget.
38  Available data suggests that on average personal income taxes rose from around 40 percent of total
taxes on income and profits in 1991,  to over 50 percent in 1998.  Corporate taxes fell correspondingly.
39  See Summers and Sunley (1995) for a survey of  early experience with VAT adoption  in Russia and
other FSU countries.
40  The high payroll tax is particularly onerous for-small businesses, and inhibits small business
activity.
41  See Martinez and McNab (2000)  for further discussion of tax administration issues for CIS
countries.  They note that although most CIS countries have a modem looking tax structure and broadly
satisfactory tax policies, tax administration is severely deficient.
21management more difficult.  Fiscal decentralization  took place early in the transition,  largely
motivated by the political  demands for greater local autonomy though economic efficiency and
macroeconomic considerations  also played an important part.  Thus spending responsibilities-
particularly in education, health and social welfare assistance-were devolved to the subnational
governments in order to relieve federal  level expenditure burdens.  At the same time, the federal
governments maintained their revenue assignments and taxing powers.  This imbalance between
expenditures  and revenues squeezed subnational budgets and compromised public service
delivery and efficiency.  Federal transfers remained inadequate to fill this gap.  This created
perverse incentives for discretionary fiscal behavior including bargaining not only between the
federal and subnational governments,  but also among the budget entities and their suppliers (such
as utility companies) at the subnational level, and a systemic problem of non-payments  and
arrears.  To the extent that subnational budgets held responsibility  for social safety net
expenditures, these problems had serious distributional and equity implications.
There are several areas of weakness.  First, although most countries have legislation that
list government responsibilities at each level, detail over revenue and expenditure  assignments  are
often lacking.  Many central governments have devolved responsibilities  downwards but are
reluctant to give up control over revenues, or to devolve real decision making authority.42 In
several of the advanced reform countries, the role of intermediate levels of government is now
relatively clear, but for the third tier, which face problems of fragmented or inefficient service
delivery, there is less clarity.  For these countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia) exploring
scale economies in service provision to improve efficiency, and organizing effective regional
organizations, is a major challenge.  Greater accountability of local government is essential to
effective reform and achieving the efficiency goals of decentralization,  but with this must come
real control  over budgetary resources.  Local  govermments need to develop their own sources of
revenue (user fees, property taxes, etc.),  and have greater autonomy over revenues.
Second, clarifying and enforcing transparent and stable rules based transfer systems is
another critical area in need of further reform.  Elaborate transfer formulas can be undermined
through end-year negotiated transfers that also serve to soften budget constraints and direct
attention towards political negotiations rather than efficient fiscal management,  as in Bulgaria
(and several CIS countries).
Third, linked to this is the need to oversee and monitor local govermment borrowing, which
has grown rapidly in recent years as an autonomous source of local financing.  Effective
regulation from the center and rigorous  standards of local government accountability are required.
Initially limiting borrowings to investment financing (the 'golden rule') where local government
fiscal responsibilities are less well developed, should be considered.  Strong information reporting
is needed, as well as building greater capacity in sub-national  govemments in public expenditure
and debt management.
Budget and  Expenditure Management.  Improvements in resource allocation need to be
accompanied by effective tools for budget monitoring, execution, and cash management.  Most of
the less advanced market reformers have embarked on developing modem treasury  systems, with
the aim of providing comprehensive payment, accounting,  and financial reporting services to the
central govemment.43 This requires  fundamental reform of existing institutions and processes
which has lagged in the transition economies.  Progress with treasury reforms has been slow, and
in some countries,  including Russia, their scope in still much too limited.  While no treasury in
any of these countries is fully functional, progress in Kazakhstan is the most advanced.  In most
42  These issues are explored in greater detail  in World Bank (200 la).
43  See Potter and Diamond (2000).
22of these countries, much better progress has been made in setting up the treasury payment system
and a basic treasury single account than in introducing a general  ledger system for government
accounting or developing capacity for financial management.  Systemic arrangements for
commitment control remains elusive.
While the development of treasury systems will bring gains from better cash management,
the achievement of the goals of good public expenditure management will be elusive if wider
issues of budget management and poor governance are not addressed.  Indeed,  insufficient
provisions for some public expenditures-especially  energy-risk leading to the development of
large payments  arrears and thereby undermining macroeconomic  management,  as painfully
evidenced,  for example, in Russia during  1996-99.  Processes of budget preparation need to be
strengthened to ensure that (i) budgets are realistic, (ii) expenditure  and revenue planning is
rooted in a macroeconomic  framework,  (iii) resource allocation decisions reflect the stated policy
priorities of the government,  (iv) budget classification systems permit a program orientation  with
clarity towards the unit of appropriation,  and (v) adequate  systems of post-budget evaluation and
audit are developed.  Transparency in budget preparation, evaluation, and audit are particularly
important to develop greater accountability over the use of public resources.
Financing  Instruments.  During this process of fiscal adjustment,  a shortage  of financing
instruments have both served to limit the size of the fiscal balances-a salutary contribution-
while making macroeconomic management more difficult.  First, privatization revenues fell far
short of  expectations and did not generate the budgetary financing (or expenditure savings)  that
were anticipated.44  The low returns reflected the widespread use of vouchers,  asset stripping,
weak foreign participation  (due to the uncertain investment  climate),  and a general  shortage of
buyers for unprofitable  enterprises.45  Second, foreign financing of the budget has been limited
except  for some of the poorer countries,  such as Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic.  Despite the
upsurge in sovereign borrowings  in private capital markets in the mid-1990s, most foreign
financing has been from official sources.  Program-based disbursements  of foreign aid were
significant during the early years but are now less so.  Third, domestic bank financing emerged as
the primary source  of budgetary financing.  Finally, arrears and non-monetary instruments
became a major source of de-facto financing as government  and enterprises tried to forestall
massive unemployment in bankrupt public enterprises, as elaborated  below.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY LESSONS
Ten years into transition,  a wide variety of fiscal outcomes characterize  the transition
countries.  Notwithstanding  the dramatic fiscal adjustment undertaken by these countries  in
quantitative terms, the imperative of macro-stabilization  and the weakness of underlying
institutional  capacity served to compromise the quality of fiscal adjustment, particularly in the
CIS countries.  Four broad conclusions can be drawn.
First, investments in public goods-public infrastructure,  health and education services-
fell in both absolute and relative terms.  The impact of this would have been minimized if there
were commensurate  increases in private  sector investments or improved efficiency in public
service delivery.  But with limited private sector capacity and a weak legal and institutional
environment for private providers, private sector response has been marginal.  At the same time,
public sector capacity and incentives  for improved performance  remain weak.  Given the under-
44  See Tanzi and Tsibouris (1999) on magnitudes of privatization proceeds  across the transition
econornies.
45  See Cheasty  and Davis (1996) for a summary discussion of these emerging trends in mnid-decade.
For a discussion of recent trends, see Tanzi and Tsibouris (1999).
23developed budget and expenditure management practices, the sharp fiscal contraction led to
declining health, and education outcomes in the region.
Second, reduced spending on govemment transfers contributed to the sharp deterioration in
income inequality  in the CIS countries.46 Some deterioration in income  inequality is arguably
inevitable in the move to market based system.  However the absence of adequate social safety
nets (dysfunctional  unemployment insurance, and social welfare assistance) and the decline in
public spending, which hit pensions and family allowances sharply, disproportionately  hurt the
poor.  At the same time, studies have shown that sustaining transfers in the CEB countries,  and
improvements  in targeting, reduced the average rise in inequality.
Third, fiscal risks have likely increased during transition as the debt burden increased  in
most countries,  and as exposure to global commodity and financial markets caused greater
volatility in commodity prices and risks of financial contagion (as amply demonstrated by the
East Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997-98).  While financial sector and other structural
reforms provide some mitigation of these types of risk, additional fiscal risks have emerged from
the costs of social and structural reforms, particularly in the banking sector, in pensions, and in
enterprise restructuring.
Fourth, high expenditures  in the CEB may have been critical  to maintaining political and
popular support for reforms, and hence contributed to the recovery of growth in the first decade
of transition.  Expenditures in CEB countries were maintained at high levels, especially in the
social sectors, which helped cushion the impact of transition and made reforms more acceptable.47
By contrast, the erosion of social transfers and public provision of social services has impacted
severely on the population in many of the CIS countries and served to sustain more entrenched
opposition to the reform process. However,  at the start of the second decade of transition,  these
expenditures in CEB countries may be unsustainably high in some countries,  and may now act as
a drag on growth.
Now that macroeconomic  stabilization has been largely achieved, even if still fragile in
many CIS countries, policy makers need to tum their attention to improving the quality of the
fiscal adjustment.  In broad terms, a differentiated agenda for fiscal reforms emerges.  For the
more advanced CEB countries, the pressing agenda  is to move forward with the second
generation of fiscal reforms: reducing fiscal risks, improving the quality of intergovernmental
finances,  and reducing the size of the state.  For the less advanced market reformers, mainly in the
CIS, policy makers need to turn their attention to more fundamental issues of fiscal sustainability
and use of the budget as an effective instrument to meet the social and policy needs.  Priorities are
strengthening basic fiscal discipline, improving the efficiency of resource allocation and use, and
strengthening  the institutional arrangements for better fiscal management.  Indeed, for most of the
transition countries,  it is only by strengthening the incentives embedded in these institutional
arrangements that policies, resources,  and outcomes be aligned, and fiscal policy be made more
effective.
46  See World Bank (2000).  Between 1987-90 and 1996-99, the average Gini measure of income
inequality increased for CIS countries by 0. 15,  and by less than half this amount-0.07-in the CEB
countries.  While an increase in income inequality during transition was anticipated and not necessarily a
bad development-reflecting  rising returns to education, the decompression of wages, and returns to risk-
taking and entrepreneurship-  the extent of the increase  in some countries has raised worries of social
tensions, and also reflect lack of opportunities, weak capabilities,  and increasing economic  insecurity for
groups within the population.
47  Research on Poland (Keane and Prasad (1999)),  for example, shows that pensions were critical to
preventing the elderly from falling into poverty whereas the erosion of pensions in Russia had a severe
impact on many elderly.  Details of pension erosion in  Russia are in  World Bank (1996).
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